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The Republic for Which It Stands
Louis H. Pollak*
Judges, whether speaking from the bench or from the lectern, are, in
general, admonished to ignore elections. And, in general, the admonition
is sound. When the great Chief Justice first proclaimed the propriety, asserted the necessity, and exercised the authority, of judicial review, and
defined its rationale and scope, he declared: "Questions in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."1 Nonetheless, I propose today
to discuss an aspect of the recently concluded presidential election campaign. My submission is that what I shall say will not transgress the
abstemious canon to which I have referred. My subject is not the outcome of the election, or what that outcome portends. My subject is one
of the questions of public policy that chiefly divided the candidates. It
is a question that I think is not inappropriate for me to discuss for the
reason that, in a constitutional system predicated on judicial review, the
way the question is answered can have implications of great consequence
for the relationships between the two political branches of government
on the one hand and the judicial branch on the other. That the question
* United States District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
This article is an expanded version of a paper I gave on November 11, 1988, at Laramie
in the course of a visit to the University of Wyoming College of Law. I want to express my
gratitude for the warm hospitality shown me by Dean Richard J. Morgan and his faculty
colleagues, and also by the students of the College of Law.
The paper was the Winston Howard Lecture, which bears the name of an illustrious
alumnus who has been a leader of the Denver Bar for many years. It was a particular pleasure to make Mr. Howard's acquaintance. That pleasure was enhanced by the discovery that,
decades ago, when Mr. Howard studied law at Laramie, the teacher who most shaped Mr.
Howard's thinking was the late Clarence Morris. Professor Morris, for so many years one
of the nation's leading scholars and teachers of torts and of jurisprudence, began his distinguished academic career at the University of Wyoming and completed it at the University
of Pennsylvania, where I was privileged to be his colleague. This article is dedicated, with
great affection and profound admiration, to the memory of Clarence Morris. In this article
I refer to President Bush as "Vice President" because that was the office he occupied during the 1988 campaign. Similarly, I refer to Vice President Quayle as "Senator" because
that was the office he occupied during the campaign.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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may in some contexts test the first principles of the separation of powers
does not, of course, mean that it would in every instance do so. And it
is my surmise that when, in years to come, we revisit the campaign of
1988, we will think it quixotic that the question which concerns me, in
the particular garb in which it presented itself, should have been treated
as an issue of large consequence. But it was. And so I offer a preliminary
assessment today, confident that it will be cut down to size by the more
deliberate verdicts arrived at by others in quieter times.
I.
The question to be addressed is this: Was Vice President Bush, in his
role as presidential candidate, right in censuring Governor Dukakis for
his veto (a veto which was promptly overridden) of a bill enacted by the
Massachusetts General Court in 1977? The bill sought to amend an existing school flag-salute statute by requiring public school teachers at the
"first class of each day... [to] lead the class in a group recitation of the
'Pledge of Allegiance' to the Flag."2 To answer this question, I will consider two sub-questions. First, in the spring of 1977, when Governor
Dukakis had to decide whether to approve the bill, did it appear, in the
light of then authoritative judicial precedents, that a statute directing
teachers to lead students in the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional?
Second, given that a republican form of government - of which both the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United States of America are
embodiments - is generally taken to presuppose a separation of the
powers vested in the three branches of government 3 what deference, if
any, do the two political branches, the legislature and the executive, when
engaged in their joint exercise of the legislative power, owe to pronouncements of the non-political branch, the judiciary, on matters constitutional?
A. Was the 1977 Bill Constitutional?
To answer the first sub-question - namely, whether the 1977 bill
requiring Massachusetts public school teachers to lead their students in
the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional - it might be thought that
nothing more is called for than to cite two justly celebrated Supreme Court
opinions: The first is Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,4 which upheld the authority of a public
school system to require a daily salute to the flag and recital of the Pledge
of Allegiance by all students, including Jehovah's Witness students for
whom rituals of obeisance to civil authority contravened fundamental religious scruples. The second is Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in
West Virginia State Board of Education v.Barnette,5 which overruled
2. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71 § 69 (Law. Co-op. 1978).
3. But see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902), quoted with approval by Frankfurter, J., in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256-57 (1957),
discussed in Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter:Judgment and the FourteenthAmendment,
67 YALE L.J. 304 (1957).

4. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
5. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Gobitis. But a decent respect for the great issues dividing the Court in
those cases instructs us that we need do more than reread Gobitis and
Barnette and then shepardize the latter case to insure that it has not, in
turn, been overruled. Our narrative begins, then, not with Felix Frankfurter in 1940 but with Francis Bellamy in 1892.
Francis Bellamy was a reformer-preacher and a writer - a selfdescribed Christian Socialist. He was apprehensive about one strain of
American life in the late nineteenth century - what he perceived as a
mounting concentration of wealth "in the hands of a dangerous plutocracy.' At the same time, he had a passionate commitment to American
nationhood. After being fired from his Baptist pulpit - evidently because
he was perceived as uncomfortably radical - Bellamy was hired as a staff
writer by Youth's Companion. Youth's Companion, a weekly, had started
life, as its name suggests, as a children's magazine. But by the 'nineties
Youth's Companion had broadened its scope: readership - which by then
included adults - was up to half a million; and the roster of contributors
- which already numbered, interalia, Kipling, Thomas Hardy, Sarah Orne
Jewett, James Whittier, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Tennyson, and Gladstone
- before the end of the decade widened to include Jules Verne, Jack London, Theodore Roosevelt, Grover Cleveland, and Woodrow Wilson.' The
year Bellamy came to Youth's Companion, 1892, was precisely the right
year for a man of Bellamy's devotion to his country's highest aspirations.
Eighteen ninety-two was the year which would mark the four hundredth
anniversary of Columbus' discovery of America. Youth's Companion
decided to use the occasion as an instrument of patriotic rededication. To
that end, Bellamy wrote the Pledge of Allegiance:
'6

I pledge allegiance to my flag and the Republic for which it stands,
one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.'
Bellamy explained both his concept of allegiance to the flag and his choice
of words:
Why allegiance to the flag? ... Because the flag stands for
the Republic. And what does that vast thing, the Republic, mean?
It is the concise political word for the Nation, - the One Nation
which the Civil War was fought to prove. To make that One Nation
6. Roberts, A ClearPledge:Instilling Values in First Grade,N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1988,
at BI, col. 1.
7. J. HART, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LITERATURE 859 (1941).
8. D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 2 (1962). In June of 1942, seven months
after Pearl Harbor, Congress made the text of the Pledge a matter of statute, modifying
Bellamy's words slightly to substitute "the Flag of the United States of America" for "my
flag." Act of June 22, 1942, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §
172 (1982). In 1954, Congress inserted the phrase "under God" between "nation" and
"indivisible." Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249. There have been no further changes
in the Pledge, which reads:
I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty
and justice for all.
36 U.S.C. § 172 (1982).
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idea clearer, we must specify that it is indivisible, as Webster and
Lincoln used to repeat in their great speeches. And its future?
Just here arose the temptation of that historic slogan of the
French Revolution which meant so much to Jefferson and his
friends, 'Liberty, equality, fraternity,' No; that would be too fanciful, too many thousands of years off in realization. But we as
a nation do stand square on the doctrine of liberty and justice for
all. That's all any one nation can handle. So those words seemed
the only roundup of past, present, and future.9
1892 was not only a Columbus celebratory year; it was an election year.
The incumbent President, Benjamin Harrison, who was seeking reelection, used the power of incumbency to proclaim October 12 Columbus Day.
Moreover, President Harrison approved the Pledge, as did his opponent,
the past-and-future President Grover Cleveland. 0 But Presidential
approval has never, at the federal level, been translated into legislative
mandate. Congress has codified the Pledge," and has directed the way
in which one should be positioned while the Pledge is being recited,'I but
has at no time directed civilians either to salute the flag or to say the
Pledge. 3
At the state level, however - as we learn from David Manwaring's
Render Unto Caesar,the first substantial chronicle of the flag salute a different pattern emerged. New York led the way, in 1898, with a statute - enacted the day after the commencement of the Spanish American
War - ordering the state Superintendent of Education to prepare programs of daily public school flag observance; a few other states followed
suit. Then, in 1919, a year after World War I and at a time of West Coast
anxiety about labor violence, Washington initiated a new statutory pattern - one directing local school authorities to "cause appropriate flag
exercises to be held in every school at least once in each week, "' with
sanctions attendant on non-observance; a statutorily prescribed part of
the observance was recital of the Pledge. Delaware followed in 1925, New
Jersey in 1932, and Massachusetts in 1935. By 1940, local school authorities in some twenty other states had, without express statutory authorization, directed that school children participate in flag observance
exercises."-'
From the time that flag observance first became a widespread public
school practice, certain minor sects entertained religious scruples about
having their children participate. Mennonites, for example, believed that:
9. Roberts, supra note 6.
10. Id
11. See Act of June 22,1942, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C.
§ 172 (1982)).
12. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1982).
13. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 n.17 (1943).
14. D. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 3 (quoting 1919 Wash. Laws 210, § 4 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4777 (1931 & Supp. 1941))).
15. Id at 3-5.
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[T]he entire New Testament... teaches nonresistance, also that
we shall love our enemies, which makes it impossible for us to take
any part in promoting war. Pledging allegiance to a flag as we see
it, though we honor and respect it, at least implies a pledge to
defend it against all its enemies, which would mean resort to arms
and to take human life.' 6
But when, in 1928, the school authorities in Greenwood, Delaware, expelled
thirty-eight Mennonite students for non-participation in the required
ritual, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) announced its willingness to provide the legal backing of a court test, "[tihe idea," according to Manwaring, "had to be abandoned . . . since the Mennonites'
doctrine of non-resistance would not allow them to act as plaintiffs in a
court of law."' 7 The ACLU had already encountered similar difficulties
in attempting to represent (1) Jehovite children expelled from the Denver schools and (2) the Tremains, members of the Elijah Voice Society,
whose nine-year-old son, Russell, was taken from parental custody for a
year when his parents removed him from a Seattle public school that
insisted on his participation in flag observances.' 8
The log jam finally broke in the fall of 1935, when Carleton Nicholls,
Jr., a student enrolled in third grade in a Lynn, Massachusetts public
school, began the school year by refusing to participate in the required
flag ceremony - a ceremony he had participated in without incident during first and second grade. The Nicholls family were Jehovah's Witnesses.
According to Carleton, the flag was "the Devil's emblem," a position
endorsed by his father, who said: "The Scriptures prove the truth of my
assertion that this world, this country, the entire worldly kingdom, is not
possessed by any government or any country, but by the Devil.... Why,
then, should I, or my son, pledge allegiance to the Devil's kingdom?"' 9
This adversary view of the relationship between the Witnesses and civil
authority seems to have had its genesis in the rhetoric of "Judge" Joseph
Franklin Rutherford, the Witnesses' second leader, who presided over the
movement from 1916 to 1942, before the Witnesses, expanding world-wide,
somewhat muted their message (which had been, inter alia, fiercely antiCatholic 0 ) and achieved a substantial measure of acceptance. The Rutherford rhetoric that apparently was the catalyst of Carleton's intransigence
was a portion of a speech Rutherford gave to rally the American faithful
during their 1935 convention. Taking note of the systematic refusal of
thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany to salute Hitler or
acquiesce in Nazi programs - a stance that led a great many Witnesses
to concentration camps - Rutherford said:
16. Id at 11 (quoting letter from Nevin Bender to Roger Baldwin (June 29, 1929) (ACLU
Archives vol. 357, "Delaware")).
17. Id at 12.
18. Id at 12-14.
19. Id at 31 (quoting Carleton Nicholls, Sr., Boston Post, Sept. 21, 1935).
20. See, for example, the hostility of the Witnesses to Catholicism that gave rise to
the events reviewed by the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301,
309 (1940).
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The Devil deceives the people and turns them away from God,
and puts forth his agents who claim that the salvation of the people comes by reason of his agents. A striking example of this is
the exaltation of one Hitler in Germany. He issues the command
that all persons shall "Heil Hitler," which in the English language
means "Salvation is by Hitler." But all people who have faith in
God know that neither Hitler, Mussolini, the NRA scheme nor any
other scheme nor any other creature can bring salvation to the
people.... Thus all such "Hel Jehovah and Christ Jesus." They
do not "Hel Hitler" nor any other creature .... 21
As Rutherford's speech had emboldened the Nichollses, so their strong
stand stirred Rutherford to proclaim, in a radio address, his full support
for Carleton's defiance of the school authorities. "The... lad," said Rutherford, "has made a wise choice, declaring himself for Jehovah God and his
kingdom.... All who act wisely will do the same thing."12 A Witness lawyer appeared with the Nicholses at a meeting with the Lynn school committee which, overruling the Nichollses' objections to Carleton Jr.'s
participation in the flag ceremony, directed that Carleton be kept out of
school until he changed his mind. Then, with the joint backing of the Witnesses and the ACLU, the Nichollses went to court. The vehicle was a
petition for.a writ of mandamus filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; the relief requested was a directive to the school committee
to rescind its action. One justice heard the application; at the request of
the parties he referred it to the full court. Over a year later, the court,
speaking through Chief Justice Rugg, unanimously dismissed the petition.23 Since the opinion in Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of
Lynn was the first ruling by a state court of last resort on the flag salute
problem, 24 and since it was the direct precursor of Governor Dukakis's
problem in 1977, it warrants some scrutiny.
In support of its insistence that Carleton participate in the flag
ceremony, the Lynn School Committee relied on two directives. One was
its own Rule 18 which had been in force for some years and which called
for recital of the Pledge at least once a week. The other was a statute
enacted in 1935, the very year of Carleton's defiance. The statute read:
The school committee shall provide for each schoolhouse under
its control, which is not otherwise supplied, flags of the United
States of silk or bunting not less than two feet long, such flags
or bunting to be manufactured in the United States, and suitable
21. D. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 30-31 (quoting The Great Multitude (pt.1), WATCH227, 235 (1935)).
22. Id at 31 (quoting Rutherford, Saluting A Flag, LOYALTY 16 (1935)).
23. Nicholls v. Mayor and School Comm., 297 Mass. 65, 7 N.E.2d 577 (1937).
24. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a brief opinion by Justice Bodine, had rejected
a Jehovah's Witness challenge to an obligatory school flag salute on February 5, 1937. But
that was an intermediate appellate decision. The state's highest court, the Court of Errors
and Appeals, affirmed without an opinion on the merits on September 22, 1937. Hering v.
State Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J.L. 525, 189 A. 629, affd 118 N.J.L. 566, 194 A. 177 (1937), appeal
dismissed, 303 U.S. 624 (1938).
TOWER
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apparatus for their display as hereinafter provided. A flag shall
be displayed, weather permitting, on the school building or
grounds on every school day and on every legal holiday or day
proclaimed by the governor or the president of the United States
for especial observance; provided, that on stormy school days, it
shall be displayed inside the building. A flag shall be displayed
in each assembly hall or other room in each such schoolhouse where
the opening exercises on each school day are held. Each teacher
shall cause the pupils under his charge to salute the flag and recite
in unison with him at said opening exercises at least once each
week the "Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag." Failure for a period
of five consecutive days by the principal or teacher in charge of
a school equipped as aforesaid to display the flag as above
required, or failure for a period of two consecutive weeks by a
teacher to salute the flag and recite said pledge as aforesaid, or
to cause the pupils under his charge so to do, shall be punished
for every such period by a fine of not more than five dollars. Failure
provided shall subof the committee to equip a school as herein
25
ject the members thereof to a like penalty.
In support of the petition for mandamus, Carleton's lawyers contended - as protesting Witnesses uniformly contended in the many flag
observance cases that followed - that to salute the flag and recite the
Pledge are actions that contravene the opening Commandments as laid
down in Exodus:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.
Thou shall not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them ....

26

To force Carleton to participate despite his religious convictions would,
so it was argued, violate his rights under the Massachusetts Constitution, most notably Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights which provides
that "no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person,
liberty, or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience."" Some reliance was also
put on the federal Constitution.
Chief Justice Rugg found that Rule 18 was an appropriate implementation of the 1935 statute and that, even before the statute, it was well
within the general discretionary authority over school affairs delegated
by the legislature. With respect to the mode of enforcement pursued
by the school committee, Chief Justice Rugg acknowledged that the
25. Act approved May 13, 1935, ch. 258, 1935 Mass. Acts 306 (amending Mass. Gen.
L. ch. 71, § 69 (Ter. ed.).
26. Exodus 20:3-5.
27. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 16
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIV

statute established no penalty for a disobedient pupil, but is
directed to the school committee and to the teacher. Power to
enforce the rule is implied in the grant of power to establish it.
It necessarily follows that, if [the statute] and the rule are valid,
the school committee was acting within its jurisdiction in excluding the petitioner from attending school. 8
In turning to the merits of Carleton's constitutional claims, Chief
Justice Rugg pointed out that "[n]either the Constitution of this Commonwealth nor that of the United States contains any definition of
religion. '2 9 To define religion Chief Justice Rugg went back half a century to the Supreme Court's opinion in Davis v. Beason,10 which sustained
a territorial statute disenfranchising adherents of polygamy." The Court
there stated that "[t]he term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obedience to his will."32 Viewed from
this perspective, said Chief Justice Rugg, it was apparent that
the flag salute and pledge of allegiance here in question do not
in any just sense relate to religion. They are not observances which
are religious in nature.... They impose no obligations as to religious worship. They are wholly patriotic in design and purpose....
The pledge of allegiance to the flag.., is an acknowledgment of
sovereignty, a promise of obedience, a recognition of authority
above the will of the individual, to be respected and obeyed. It
has nothing to do with religion."
Accordingly, since "[tihere is nothing in the salute or the pledge of
allegiance which constitutes an act of idolatry, or which approaches to
any religious observance," it follows that the required observance "does
not in any reasonable sense hurt, molest, or restrain a human being in
respect to 'worshipping God' within the meaning of the words in the [Massachusetts] Constitution."'" Chief Justice Rugg then rejected Carleton's
federal constitutional claims on the authority of Hamilton v. Regents of
35
decided by the Supreme Court in 1934.
the University of California,
There, speaking through Justice Butler and with a concurrence by Justice
Cardozo, the Court rejected a challenge by two religiously-motivated
pacifist students to a rule prescribed by the Regents of the University
of California requiring male undergraduates to take a course in military
28. 297 Mass. at 68, 7 N.E.2d at 579 (citations omitted).
29. Id.

30. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
31. In Davis v. Beason the Court affirmed a denial of habeas corpus on behalf of one

who, with others, was convicted of conspiring to obstruct territorial law by falsely swearing, in order to be registered as Idaho voters, that they did not belong to an organization
advocating polygamy when they were in fact members of the Mormon Church.
32. 133 U.S. at 342.
33. 297 Mass. at 70-71, 7 N.E.2d at 580.
34. Id
35. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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science.36 Chief Justice Rugg did not address certain elements of Hamilton v. Regents which would seem to distinguish that case from the case
at bar - namely, that the Hamilton v. Regents plaintiffs were not directed
by the university to participate in some particularized form of ritual, and,
furthermore, that, as Justice Butler noted,7 "California has not drafted
or called them to attend the university.

Chief Justice Rugg's opinion, handed down on April 1, 1937, terminated the Nicholls litigation; not regarding the case as presenting a promising platform for further development of the federal claims, counsel forbore
to seek Supreme Court review. 8 But appeals to the Supreme Court were
taken in two other state cases - one from Georgia and one from New Jersey - that were virtually contemporaneous with Nicholls and tracked it
closely in result and in rationale. In both instances the Court "dismissed
[the appeal] for the want of a substantial federal question,"3 9 citing Hamilton v. Regents.40 The first dismissal was on December 13, 1937, the second
on March 14, 1938. And a little more than a year later, the Court denied
certiorari to review a decision of the California Supreme Court 4' which
followed, as controlling, the Court's dismissals of the appeals from the
36. The plaintiffs were members of the Methodist Episcopal Church which had, in the
early 'thirties, taken the doctrinal position that church members who were conscientious
objectors should be exempt from military service and training. Id at 251-53.
37. Id. at 262. In putting into focus the Fourteenth Amendment claim advanced by
the Hamilton v. Regents plaintiffs, Justice Butler said that "[tihere need be no attempt to
enumerate or comprehensively to define what is included in the 'liberty' protected by the
due process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere
to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which these students base their objections
to the order prescribing military training." Id (citations omitted). Justice Cardozo, whose
concurrence was joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, stated that "I assume for present
purposes that the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by
the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states";
nonetheless, "I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the state to 'the
free exercise' of religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation, and
by the generations that have followed. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342." Id at 265. In
assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment embraced the First Amendment's religious liberties, Justice Cardozo paralleled the course pursued in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925), where the Court stated "we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of
the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." The Gitlow assumption soon
bore fruit in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Justice Cardozo's cognate assumption
was to bear fruit in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
38. Evidently ACLU counsel were directing appellate strategy, and they may reasonably have felt that the federal claims had not been effectively presented to the Supreme Judicial Court, which was the court of first instance. D. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 59.
39. Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656, dismissingappealfrom 184 Ga. 580,192 S.E. 218
(1937), and Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 (1938), dismissing appeal from 118
N.J.L. 566, 194 A. 177, affg 117 N.J.L. 525, 189 A. 629 (1937).
40. In both dismissals, the Court also cited Coale v. Pearson, 290 U.S. 597 (1933), dismissing appealfrom 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54 (1933), which Justice Butler had characterized
as "similar" to the case at bar in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. at 264 (1936).
41. Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 82 P.2d 391 (1938), appealdismissed and
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 621 (1939). The Court first dismissed the attempted appeal for want
of jurisdiction (presumably because a local school rule, rather than a state statute, was
involved), and then, treating the appeal papers as a petition for certiorari, denied the writ.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 16
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIV

Georgia and New Jersey decisions. On the same day the Court affirmed
a judgment of a three-judge Massachusetts federal court which, in reliance on Nicholls and on Hamilton v. Regents, denied an application for
a declaratory judgment invalidating the Massachusetts flag-salute statute."'
The foregoing decisions, and others in the late 'thirties in which
Supreme Court review was not sought, ' I formed a strong doctrinal corpus
for the proposition that public school children could be required to participate in flag observance ceremonies notwithstanding their religiouslybased resistance to manifesting obeisance to a symbol of secular authority.
But the judicial chorus was not unanimous. There were mutterings of disagreement from a Texas appellate court." And Judge Irving Lehman of
the New York Court of Appeals filed a notable concurring opinion in a
case in which his colleagues, while sustaining the validity of an obligatory school flag salute, held that the parents of a non-saluting thirteenyear old who sent their daughter back to school each time she was sent
home for refusing to salute could not be prosecuted criminally for failing
to "cause such minor to attend upon instruction as hereinbefore
required."4 5 The majority of the court, while sustaining the salute, made
plain its hope that school authorities could gain compliance through tactful
instruction rather than coercion. But if all else failed and "it is thought
necessary to carry the matter further, the action must be against the scholar, not the parents."4 6 Judge Lehman, writing separately, put his doubts
about coercion into doctrinal form:
The salute to the flag is a gesture of love and respect - fine
when there is real love and respect back of the gesture. The flag
is dishonored by a salute by a child in reluctant and terrified obedience to a command of secular authority which clashes with the
dictates of conscience. The flag "cherished by all our hearts"
should not be soiled by the tears of a little child. The Constitution does not permit, and the Legislature 4never intended, that the
flag should be so soiled and dishonored. 1
Judge Lehman's discordant views, announced from the highest bench
in New York, had been anticipated by a trial judge in Pennsylvania. That
judge was Albert Branson Maris, appointed a federal district judge by
Franklin Roosevelt on June 22, 1936, who was to be elevated to the Third
Circuit two years later, and who was to become the longest-serving federal judge in the history of the republic."s The travail of Lillian and Wil42. Johnson v. Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass.), affd, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
43. State ex reL Bleich v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 139 Fla. 43, 190 So. 815 (1939);
People ex reL Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523, 18 N.E.2d 840 (1939).
44. Reynolds v. Rayborn, 116 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
45. 279 N.Y. at 526, 18 N.E.2d at 841 (majority opinion quoting N.Y. EDuC. LAW §
627(B)(2)(Consol. Laws ch. 16)).
46. Id at 533, 18 N.E.2d at 844.
47. Id at 539, 18 N.E.2d at 847 (Lehman, J., concurring).
48. Judge Marls - a judge for fifty-two years and four-and-a-half months as of the date
of this lecture - eclipsed Learned Hand in judicial longevity. Judge Hand was appointed
a district judge in May of 1909, was elevated to the Second Circuit in 1924, and died in August
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liam Gobitas (transformed, by errors of school officials and lawyers, into
"Gobitis") began in the fall of 1935, several months before Maris became
a judge. Lillian, twelve, and William, ten, were children enrolled in the
Minersville public schools. Flag observance had been traditional in the
Minersville schools for some twenty years,' 9 but no school rule required
such observance until November 6, 1935. On that day, in the face of unwillingness by Lillian and William and another Jehovah's Witness child to
continue to participate - a stance evidently influenced by the widely publicized defiance of Carleton Nicholls two months before - the school board
approved a resolution directing
[t]hat the Superintendent of the Minersville Public Schools be
required to demand that all teachers and pupils of the said schools
be required to salute the flag of our Country as a part of the daily
exercises. That refusal to salute the flag shall be regarded as an
act of insubordination and shall be dealt with accordingly. 0
Lillian and William remained unwilling to participate in the prescribed
ceremony. Lillian tried to explain why:
The Constitution of the United States is based upon religious freedom. According to the dictates of my conscience, based on the
Bible, I must give full allegiance to Jehovah God.51
And William wrote:
Our School Directors
Dear Sirs
I don't salute the flag because I have promised to do the will
of God. That means that I must not worship anything out of harmony with God's commandments."
Rejecting these explanations, the school board on the same day authorized Superintendent Charles E. Roudabush to expel Lillian and William
and another recalcitrant Jehovah's Witness student. Superintendent
Roudabush did as he was bade - and, one surmises, performed the chore
of expelling the children with some gusto, given the views he was to
express some years later:
There is nothing in this pledge which should in any way conflict
with any good citizen's religion.... It is evident that any religion
which takes exception to this obligation or respect owed by every
of 1961. See

Judge Marls, BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES 311-12 (2d ed. 1983), and, as to Judge Hand,

as to

UNITED STATES,

id. at 206. Judge Maris died on February 7, 1989. He had turned ninety-five two months
earlier. Judge Maris filed his last opinion for the Third Circuit - Henry v. Perry, Civ. No.
88-3226 - on February 6, 1989, the day before he died.
49. D. MANWARING, supra note 8, at 82.
50. Id at 83 (quoting Minersville School Board Minutes (Nov. 6, 1935)).
51. Orenstein, Flag Salute Flap recalls the old days in Minersville, The Morning Call

(Allentown, Pa.), Oct. 9, 1988, at A.l, A.2.
52. Id at A.l.
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American to his country's flag fosters a spirit of antagonism to
his country, its laws, institutions and traditions."
Also, according to the Superintendent, "America is going wild on so-called
liberty and freedom. Academic freedom cannot be applied to children of
teen ages and, especially, to those who have been given dwarfed education at home. 5
Walter Gobitas, Lillian's and William's father, brought suit in their
behalf in federal court. Contending that the expulsion of his children contravened the state and federal Constitutions, the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the school board and Superintendent Roudabush from enforcing the
Roudabush order. In an opinion filed on December 1, 1937, Judge Maris
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss:
If an individual sincerely bases his acts or refusals to act on religious grounds they must be accepted as such and may only be
interfered with if it becomes necessary to do so in connection with
the exercise of the police power, that is, if it appears that the public safety, health or morals or property or personal rights will be
prejudiced by them. To permit public officers to determine whether
the views of individuals sincerely held and their acts sincerely
undertaken on religious grounds are in fact based on convictions
religious in character would be to sound the death knell of religious liberty. To such a pernicious and alien doctrine this court
cannot subscribe.55
Noting that it "seems obvious that [Lillian's and William's) refusal
to salute the flag in school exercises could not in any way prejudice or
imperil the public safety, health or morals or the property or personal
rights of their fellow citizens," Judge Mars concluded that the School
Board's "requirement of that ceremony as a condition of the exercising
of their right or the performance of their duty to attend the public schools
violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and infringed the liberty guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 6 Judge Maris acknowledged
that the highest courts of Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Jersey had
come to a different conclusion. But he said that those courts had "overlooked the fundamental principle of religious liberty to which we have
referred," 57 and that the reliance of those courts on Hamilton v. Regents
was misplaced, since that case (1) was one in which public safety was significantly implicated, and (2) was not one in which the excluded students
were required by law to attend school. By contrast, in the case of Lillian
and William, "[olur beloved flag, the emblem of religious liberty, has apparently been used as an instrument to impose a religious test as a condition
53. Id at A.2.
54. Id
55. Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1937), affd, 108
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939), reu'd 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
56. Id
57. Id
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of receiving the benefits of public education. And this has been done
without any compelling necessity of public safety or welfare." 58
Six months later, following a trial, Judge Maris filed a further opinion containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. "The facts as I have
found them sustain the allegations of the bill."5 9 Accordingly, after
reaffirming the principles announced in his earlier denial of the motion
to dismiss, Judge Maris concluded that the challenged expulsion order
"deprives the plaintiffs of their liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States,''60 wherefore the
plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against the defendants restraining them from continuing in force the order expelling the
minor plaintiffs from the Minersville Public School and prohibiting their attendance at said school and from requiring the minor
flag as a condition of their right
plaintiffs to salute the national
61
to attend the said school.
Two things Judge Maris did not do should be noted. He did not reiterate
his previous recital that the action of the defendants contravened the Pennsylvania Constitution. And he did not reexamine his prior assessment of
Nicholls and the Georgia and New Jersey cases as insufficiently sensitive to the "fundamental principle of religious liberty"6 2 involved, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court had in the interim dismissed appeals
from the Georgia and New Jersey62decisions and had cited Hamilton v.
Regents in its orders of dismissal. 3
Over a year later, in November of 1939, the Third Circuit affirmed
Judge Maris.6 4 Of the extended opinion filed by Judge William Clark little need be said. The principal point to be made is the confident assertion
that the entire corpus of Anglo-American jurisprudence, from the Year
Books to our own time, will not disclose any other opinion that ranks as
high on the Richter scale of judicial pomposity.6 The second point - a
matter of judicial technique - is that the only doctrinal discussion that
cuts close to the heart of the case was reserved for a document entitled
"Appendix;" there Judge Clark made the point (which was not a trivial
one) that three of the four cases in which the Supreme Court had dismissed
appeals or affirmed were situations in which "the state legislature declared,
58. Id at 585.
59. Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1938), affd, 108
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
60. Id at 275.
61. Id
62. 21 F. Supp. at 584.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939).
65. For example, the opinion opens with the following: "Eighteen big states have seen
fit to exert their power over a small number of little children ('and forbid them not')." (indicatthe 'big states'] according to the latest census
ing in footnotes that the "Itotal population [of
[was] circa 38,000,000" and that "[aiccording to the latest casualty lists [the number of children was) circa 120"). Id at 683.
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and the highest state court affirmed, a policy of flag saluting," by reason
of which "Itihe connection between an omission to salute the flag and the
commission of an injury to the public weal, becomes legally and factually
closer.", In the fourth case, which involved a regulation that had been
upheld by the state's highest court, the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction and denied certiorari. 7
The Third Circuit's affirmance of Judge Maris was the first appellate
determination that an obligatory flag salute was, as to participants whose
religious principles precluded obeisance to secular symbols, unconstitutional. Predictably, the Minersville School authorities petitioned for certiorari. Had Judge Clark's opinion invalidated the salute on the dual
grounds adumbrated by Judge Maris' first opinion - i.e., that the compulsion transgressed both the state and federal Constitutions - it is conceivable that the Supreme Court would not have thought the Third
Circuit's decision required review. For under those circumstances the judgment of the Third Circuit could not have been reversed unless the Supreme
Court were to overturn the lower courts' construction of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and it is, of course, most unusual for the Supreme Court
to find error in the concurrent holdings of a district court and a court of
appeals on a matter of local law. But the state constitutional claim was
not mentioned in the conclusions of law contained in Judge Mars' second
opinion - the conclusions of law undergirding his decree. And, similarly,
Judge Clark treated the case as solely a federal matter: "These little children ('suffer them') are asking us to afford them the protection of the First
Amendment... to the Constitution and to permit them the 'free exercise' of their 'religion'." Under these circumstances, the Third Circuit's
ruling was clearly in tension with the Georgia, New Jersey and Massachusetts rulings that Judge Clark had sought to distinguish. Supreme
Court review was appropriate. Certiorari was granted on March 4, 1940.66
The case was argued on April 25 and decided on June 3. On that June
morning - as Britain was completing the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of allied troops from Dunkirk, and Hitler's armies were consolidating their sweep through the low countries and into France - Chief Justice
Hughes called upon Justice Frankfurter to announce the Court's decision
66. Id. at 693 (citation omitted). In a closing flourish of pomposity, the final portion
of the "Appendix" begins: "The record before us sheds but little light on the problems in
educational psychology here discussed." Id at 694.
67. Id at 693.
68. Id at 684. Plaintiffs' counsel did contend in the Supreme Court that defendants'
actions contravened the Pennsylvania Constitution, but neither the Court's opinion nor the
dissent mentioned the contention. 310 U.S. at 589-90 (1940).
69. 309 U.S. 645 (1940). In his opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter explained that
certiorari was granted because the decision below "ran counter to several per curiam dispositions of this Court." 310 U.S. at 592. The footnote supporting this recital cites Leoles v.
Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937) (dismissing the appeal from the Georgia court's decision); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 J1938) (dismissing the appeal from the New Jersey
court's decision); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 621 (1939) (dismissing the appeal and
denying certiorari to review the California court's decision); and Johnson v. Deerfield, 306
U.S. 621 (affirming the Massachusetts three-judge federal district court's decision), reh'g
denied, 307 U.S. 650 J1939). See supra notes 39, 41 and 42.
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in No. 690, MinersvilleSchoolDistrictv. Gobitis.7 The opinion began by
stating the case and explaining why certiorari was granted. Then the opinion paid handsome acknowledgement to two amici briefs which urged affirmance: "By their able submissions, the Committee on the Bill of Rights
of the American Bar Association and the American Civil Liberties Union,
as friends of the Court, have helped us to our conclusion."71 But affirmance
was not the conclusion to which the amici helped the Court. The Court
reversed the Third Circuit. Justice Frankfurter's opinion referred to some
of the principal religion cases, including Hamilton u. Regents, and also
certain of the polygamy cases, such as Davis v. Beason.72 Then, after
observing that "[wie are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the
hierarchy of legal values" and that "[niational unity is the basis of national
security,"' 7 Justice Frankfurter said:
The precise issue ...for us to decide is whether the legislatures
of the various states and the authorities in a thousand counties
and school districts of this country are barred from determining
the appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or
religious....
The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by those
compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational
process is not for our independent judgment .... For ourselves,
we might be tempted to say that the deepest patriotism is being
engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most crochety [sic]
beliefs.... But the courtroom is not the arena for debating issues
of educational policy.... So to hold would in effect make us the
school board for the country. That authority has not been given
to this Court, nor should we assume it.
That the flag-salute is an allowable portion of a school program for those who do not invoke conscientious scruples is surely not debatable. But for us to insist that, though the ceremony
may be required, exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents, is to maintain that there is no basis for a legislative judgment that such an exemption might introduce elements of
difficulty into the school discipline, might cast doubts in the minds
of the other children which would themselves weaken the effect
of the exercise....
Judicial review, itself a limitation on popular government, is
a fundamental part of our constitutional scheme. But to the legisis committed the guardianship of
lature no less than to courts
74
deeply-cherished liberties.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

310 U.S. 586.
Id at 592. It would appear from the report of the case that these were the only amici.
Id. at 594-95.
Id at 595.
Id at 597-600.
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Joining Justice Frankfurter were the Chief Justice and Justices Roberts,
Black, Reed, Douglas and Murphy. Justice McReynolds concurred in the
result. Justice Stone dissented alone; the closing paragraphs of his opinion were these:
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the
people that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs.
It is also an expression of faith and a command that freedom of
mind and spirit must be preserved, which government must obey,
if it is to adhere to that justice and moderation without which no
free government can exist. For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the religious freedom of small
minorities, which is admittedly within the scope of the protection
of the Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same judicial
scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe the
constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities.
With such scrutiny I cannot say that the inconveniences which
may attend some sensible adjustment of school discipline in order
that the religious convictions of these children may be spared,
presents a problem so momentous or pressing as to outweigh the
freedom from compulsory violation of religious faith which has
been thought worthy of constitutional protection. 5
Gobitis was to last only three years. Although it is hardly commonplace for the Court to overrule an earlier constitutional ruling, it has happened a number of times in the one hundred and eighty-five years since
the Court first wielded the gavel of judicial review. And in one notorious
instance - the Legal Tender Cases76 - the turn-about was accomplished
within a year. But in the Legal Tender Cases what changed a five-to-three
ruling into a contrary five-to-four ruling was the retirement of one justice
and the appointment of two. In the flag-salute cases, three members of
the Gobitis majority - Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy - announced
in June of 1942 their abandonment of the position they had subscribed
to only two years before. That announcement came in dissent from the
Court's validation, in Jones v. Opelika," of municipal ordinances in
Alabama, Arkansas and Arizona which required street vendors to pay a
license fee; in amplifying their view that the exaction of a fee from
Jehovah's Witnesses selling Witness publications was unconstitutional,
the three Justices said:
The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in our opinion suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion
practiced by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction which Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
75. Id at 606-07.
76. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1871) overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
77, 316 U.S. 584 (1942). Chief Justice Stone also dissented. The majority consisted of
Justices Reed (the author of the Court's opinion), Roberts, Frankfurter, Byrnes and Jackson.
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took against the same religious minority, and is a logical extension of the principles upon which that decision rested. Since we
joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an
appropriate occasion to state that we now believe it also was
wrongly decided. Certainly our democratic form of government,
functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities,
however unpopular and unorthodox those views may be. The First
Amendment does not put the right freely to exercise religion in
a subordinate position. We fear, however, that the opinion in these
and in the Gobitis case do exactly that."'
The defection of Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, while dramatic,
was not of itself sufficient to overturn Gobitis. What broke the back of
Gobitis was the retirement of two members of the Gobitis majority - Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice McReynolds - and their replacement by
justices of a different temper. The new justices were Jackson and Rutledge."9 Justice Rutledge's views were a matter of public record. In April
of 1942, two months before Jones v. Opelika, while still a member of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Justice Rutledge had dissented from a judgment sustaining the application of a District of Columbia street-vendor licensing ordinance to two Jehovah's Witnesses selling
Witness periodicals, Watchtower and Consolation:
This is no time to wear away further the freedoms of conscience
and mind by nicely technical or doubtful construction. Everywhere
they are fighting for life. War has now added its censorships. They,
with other liberties, give ground in the struggle. They can be lost in
time also by steady legal erosion wearing down broad principle into
thin right. Jehovah's Witnesses have had to choose between their
consciences and public education for their children. In my judgment, they should not have to give up also the right to disseminate
their religious views in an orderly manner on the public streets,
exercise it at the whim of public officials, or be taxed for doing
so without their license. I think the judgment should be reversed. 0
Justice Jackson, by contrast, was on the Supreme Court when Jones
v. Opelika was decided, and he joined Justice Reed's majority opinion.
So there was no public indication that Justice Jackson would embrace
an opportunity to jettison Gobitis. But the Justice's former cabinet colleagues may have recalled that in June of 1940, Jackson, then Attorney
General, had expressed at a cabinet meeting his vehement disagreement
with Justice Frankfurter's Gobitis opinion."
78. Id at 623-24.
79. To be precise, Justice Jackson replaced Justice Stone, who was elevated to the center
chair on Chief Justice Hughes' retirement, and Justice Rutledge replaced Justice Byrnes,
who served briefly in succession to Justice McReynolds.
80. Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See Pollak, Wiley
Blount Rutledge: Profile of a Judge, 1979 U. ILL. L. FORUM 301 (1979) (discussing Justice
Rutledge's decision in Busey and his subsequent jurisprudence on the Supreme Court).
81. Blue, One Nation, Divisible, With Liberty For None, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1988,
SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 199, 211 (1954).

at A27, col. 2. See III THE
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The vehicle for reexamining Gobitis was not long in coming. In early
1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution
which, after extended paraphrase of portions of the Gobitis opinion,
described "the commonly accepted salute to the Flag," including the
Pledge of Allegiance, and directed "all teachers. . . and pupils in such
[public] schools.., to participate in the salute... provided, however, that
refusal to salute the Flag be regarded
as an act of insubordination, and
'8 2
shall be dealt with accordingly. "
Following the decision in Jones v. Opelika, three Jehovah's Witness
parents - Walter Barnett"' and a sister and a brother-in-law - sued in
a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the directive as against
their own and all other children enrolled in public schools whose religious
scruples precluded participation in the flag-salute ceremony. Because the
directive was rooted in a state statute and was of statewide application,
a three-judge panel was convened; the panel was chaired by Judge John
Parker, the senior member of the Fourth Circuit. A motion to dismiss,
predicated on Gobitis, was denied.14 Judge Parker's opinion noted that
three members of the Gobitis majority had abandoned it in Jones v.
Opelika, and, moreover, that the Court's opinion in Jones v. Opelika had
disclaimed reliance on Gobitis in reaching the Jones v. Opelika result. 8
Judge Parker wrote:
Under such circumstances, and believing, as we do, that the flag
salute here required is violative of religious liberty when required
of persons holding the religious views of plaintiffs, we feel that
we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if through a blind following of a decision which the Supreme Court has thus impaired
as an authority, we would deny protection to rights which we
regard as among the most sacred of those protected by constitutional guaranties. 8
Accordingly, Judge Parker and his colleagues determined "that the
regulation of the Board requiring that school children salute the flag is
void in so far as it applies to children having conscientious scruples against
giving such
salute and that, as to them, its enforcement should be
8' 7
enjoined."
82. Resolution of West Virginia Board of Education, January 9, 1942, reprintedin 319
U.S. at 626-28, n.2 (1943).
83. His name somehow became "Barnette" in court. See D. MANWARING, supra note
8, at 303 n.14.
84. Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (D. W. Va. 1942),
affd 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
85. "No religious symbolism is involved, such as was urged against the flag salute in
[Gobitis]. For us there is no occasion to apply here the principles taught by that opinion."
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 598 (1942).
86. 47 F. Supp. at 253. At the time of Judge Parker's opinion, Justice Rutledge had
not yet been named to the Court, so consideration of his view of Gobitis was not called for.
For a discussion of Judge Parker's non-obeisant posture toward an as-of-then unoverruled
Supreme Court precedent, see Pollak, supra note 80, at 313-15.
87. 47 F. Supp. at 255.
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On direct appeal from the three-judge court, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jackson, affirmed. The celebrated rhetoric of Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State Boardof Education v. Barnette8 - "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"" - was matched
by the passion of Justice Frankfurter's dissent:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in
history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed
by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant
I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the
thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew
nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial
obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or
latest immigrants to these shores. As a member of this Court I
am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the
Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how
mischievous I may deem their disregard. 0
Justices Roberts and Reed dissented in Barnette because they continued to "adhere to the views expressed by the Court in [Gobitis]."9
Justices Black and Douglas, while "substantially in agreement" with
Justice Jackson, filed a brief concurrence elaborating on their "change
of view" from Gobitis2 Justice Murphy, stating "I agree with the opinion of the Court and join in it," also filed a brief concurrence.9 3 Chief Justice
Stone and Justice Rutledge were evidently content with Justice Jackson's
opinion, for they said nothing.
Barnette, decided on Flag Day in 1943, is the Supreme Court's last
word on the flag salute. The difficulties that confronted Governor Dukakis
thirty-four years after Barnette in deciding whether to veto the 1977 bill,
and the difficulties that we may confront today, forty-five years after Barnette, in second-guessing the Governor's veto, are compounded by the fact
that the constitutional logic deployed by Justice Jackson in Barnette did
88. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
89. Id. at 642.

90. Id at 646-47. According to Max Freedman:
When Frankfurter circulated this dissent, two members of the Supreme
Court, who need not be identified here, called formally on Frankfurter in his
Chambers to plead with him to omit or soften this opening paragraph. They
said it was too emotional and too personal for inclusion in a Supreme Court
opinion. Frankfurter said they had given him very good reasons for taking these

words out, but he had even better reasons for keeping them in; and in they
stayed.

FREEDMAN, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, THEIR CORRESPONDENCE,

1928-1945 701 (1967).

91. 319 U.S. at 642-43 (Roberts & Reed, J.J., dissenting).
92. Id at 643 (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
93. Id at 644 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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not keep pace with his rhetoric. What Justice Jackson tried to do was
to defeat Gobitis by outflanking it rather than by meeting it frontally.
But the flanking maneuver failed.
What happened was this: Justice Frankfurter had, it will be recalled,
said in Gobitis: "That the flag-salute is an allowable portion of a school
program for those who do not invoke conscientious scruples is surely not
debatable. 94 And then Justice Frankfurter went on to argue that judi'
cial insistence that "exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents"95
would involve an insupportable judicial finding that those state officials
charged with making school policy could not reasonably have concluded
that an exemption for dissenting children "might cast doubts in the minds
of the other children which would themselves weaken the effect of the exercise. ' But, rather than undertaking to reassess the balance Justice
Frankfurter struck in favor of state officialdom and against those asserting religious scruples, Justice Jackson recast the issue so as to put out
of account
"9

one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with
which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' motive for
enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many
citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a com97
pulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.
Then, having eviscerated the very elements that had given the plaintiffs standing in Barnette and in Gobitis, Justice Jackson said:
The Gobitis decision ... assumed, as did the argument in that
case and in this, that power exists in the State to impose the flag
salute discipline upon school children in general. The Court only
examined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned general rule. The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed
upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of this power ....11
And the balance of the opinion is an attempt to demonstrate the nonexistence of "this power." The argument is arresting:
National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion
and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our
Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means
for its achievement.
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some
end thought essential to their time and country have been waged
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940).
Id at 599-600.
Id at 600.
319 U.S. at 634-35.
Id at 635-36 (citation omitted).
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by many good as well as by evil men.... As first and moderate
methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity.... Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment
to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding
these beginnings. 9
Sobering and noble words. But do they, as Justice Jackson supposed,
undermine Justice Frankfurter's proposition that, questions of the religious scruples of particular children aside: power exists in the State to
impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in general?0 0 The
question is one I tried to address twenty-five years ago, when I first endeavored to go behind the words of Barnette to what those words signified.
The answer I then formulated is one I cannot improve on, so I will take
the liberty of sharing it with you. To conclude that there is in the panoply of state sovereignty no general power to require school children to
salute the flag is, I said:
certainly, an unconventional view of the constitutional limitations
imposed upon the states. The states, after all, are the repositories of general governmental power. And - questions of federal
supremacy aside - this means that for the most part the Constitution limits state authority only insofar as particular exertions
of the state's general governmental power impinge on the several
federal rights specified in the fourteenth amendment and other
limiting provisions of the Constitution. Surely what Justice Frankfurter meant, when he said in Gobitis that West Virginia's power
to include a flag salute in the school program was "not debatable,"
was that - apart from the question of the state's power to require
the salute of those who asserted particularized federal liberties - West Virginia had as much authority to require a flag salute
as to make each schoolchild learn the national anthem or take
courses in the history of West Virginia and the United States.
There appear to be only two qualifications of the broad proposition that the states may, apart from the particularized federal
liberties, exert their general governmental powers as they will. One
qualification, which has thus far substantially defied judicial
enforcement, is that the states must maintain a republican form
of government. Another is that the states must refrain from undertaking programs "respecting an establishment of religion." The
flag salute was not regarded as an establishment of religion by
Justice Jackson or those Justices who joined his opinion. Nor
should it have been so regarded, for it was not a religious exer99. Id at 640-41.
100. 310 U.S. at 599.
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cise. It was simply an exercise which impinged on the religious,
other, first amendment scruples of some schoolchiland perhaps
01o
dren.
Why do I belabor this issue? Because, in determining the impact of
Barnette on subsequently emergent problems - e.g., the constitutionality of the bill Governor Dukakis decided to veto - it may matter a great
deal whether Justice Jackson's eschewal of interest in a would-be nonsaluter's "possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with
which they are held" is to be understood as the considered view of a
majority of the Barnette Court - i.e., at least five of the six justices who
voted to affirm - and hence precedentia4 or only as the considered view
of a plurality.Cutting in favor of giving full weight to what Justice Jackson wrote is that Justice Murphy's concurrence not only expressed agreement with the opinion of the Court but also contained the following
statement: "I am unable to agree that the benefits that may accrue to
society from the compulsory flag salute are sufficiently definite and tangible to justify the invasion of freedom and privacy that is entailed or
to compensate for a restraint on the freedom of the individual to be vocal
or silent according to his conscience or personal inclination. 10 2 Cutting
the other way is that Justices Black and Douglas, in the concurrence in
which they characterized themselves as "substantially in agreement with
the [Court's] opinion, '"103 concluded as follows:
Neither our domestic tranquility in peace nor our martial effort
in war depend on compelling little children to participate in a
ceremony which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual
condemnation. If, as we think, their fears are groundless, time and
reason are the proper antidotes for their errors. The ceremonial,
when enforced against conscientious objectors, more likely to
defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a handy implement for
disguised religious persecution. As such, it is inconsistent with
our Constitution's plan and purpose. '"
Eighteen years after Barnette, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, endorsed the Barnette language that I regard as problematic. The
case, Lathrop v.Donahue,10 5 involved a challenge to an integrated bar's
use of the dues of the plaintiff member to advance political causes to which
the plaintiff did not subscribe. The plurality did not reach the merits of
the case, regarding the challenge as insufficiently concrete. Justice Harlan
rejected the challenge on the merits, and, in so doing, intimated that the
case would have required a different result had the state bar, like the school
board in Barnette, compelled the plaintiff to speak on behalf of the state
organization: "The holding of Barnette was that, no matter how strong
or weak such beliefs might be, the Legislature of West Virginia was not
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Pollak, Foreword"Public Prayersin Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 72 (1963).
319 U.S. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Id at 643 (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
Id at 644.
367 U.S. 820 (1961).
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free to require as concrete and intimate an expression of belief in any cause
as that involved in a compulsory pledge of allegiance.""',
Notwithstanding this weighty sponsorship, and the added fact that
Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Harlan's concurrence, I would not
regard it as prudent to treat Barnette so broadly - i.e., as holding that
the Barnette plaintiffs' children's "possession of particular religious
views" was irrelevant to the result. It seems to me instructive that the
Court's judgment in Barnette comports with a narrower reading of what
the Court decided. The Court's judgment affirmed the decree entered by
Judge Parker's three-judge-court - an injunction barring required participation in the flag ceremony by "children having religious scruples
against" such participation. 0 7 And that narrower reading also comports
with the construction of Barnette followed by the Court in Wooley v.
Maynard""- a case decided on April 20, 1977, while the Massachusetts
bill was awaiting Governor Dukakis' signature or disapproval.
In Wooley, plaintiffs Maxine and George Maynard sued in the federal district court in New Hampshire to enjoin various state officials from
enforcing, as to them, statutes requiring that New Hampshire automobile license plates carry the legend "Live Free or Die" and imposing criminal penalties for covering up any of the writing on license plates. A
three-judge court found in the Maynards' favor and enjoined defendants
"from arresting and prosecuting plaintiffs at any time in the future for
covering over that portion of their license plates that contains the motto
'Live Free or Die'."" °9
The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, affirmed.
The opinion stated that "[tihe Maynards consider the New Hampshire
State motto to be repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs,
and therefore assert it to be objectionable to disseminate this message
by displaying it on their automobiles.""10 According to Mr. Maynard,
by religious training and belief, I believe my 'government' Jehovah's Kingdom - offers everlasting life. It would be contrary
to that belief to give up my life for the state, even if it meant living in bondage.
I also disgree with the motto on political grounds. I believe
that life is more precious than freedom."'
In sustaining the Maynards' objection to advertising a motto they
profoundly disagreed with, Chief Justice Burger found Barnette to be controlling authority:
106. 1& at 858 (Harlan, J., concurring).
107. Pollak, supra note 101, at 73 n.42.
108. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
109. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D. N.H. 1976) affd 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
The court declined to direct the defendants to issue to plaintiffs a license plate not embossed
with "Live Free or Die," notwithstanding that the record suggested that such a plate could
be made for five dollars or thereabouts.
110. 430 U.S. at 707 (citation omitted).
111. 1& at 707 n.2 (quoting Affidavit of George Maynard, App. 3).
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Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life.., to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view
he finds unacceptable.
The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New
Hampshire's motto is not the test; most Americans also find the
flag salute acceptable. The First Amendment protects the right
of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
commands,
and to refuse to foster, in the way New 1Hampshire
2
an idea they find morally objectionable.

In sum, Wooley confirms my view that Barnette should be read as
protecting against compelled utterances with which, on grounds of religious, political or moral principle, the speaker disagrees, as distinct from
compelled utterances with which the speaker is not in substantive disagreement but which, to borrow Justice Murphy's phrase in his Barnette
concurrence, it is the speaker's "personal inclination" not to make. Thus,
if the Maynards were today to move to Buffalo and learn that the New
York Legislature and Governor Cuomo had ordained that New York
license plates should include the legend "I Love New York" - a sentiment the Maynards concurred in but felt shy about broadcasting on the
nation's highways - I submit that the Supreme Court would give their
new grievance short shrift. If I am right in this, it signifies that Barnette
is to be read as proscribing obligatory participation in flag ceremonies
when such participation connotes endorsement of a belief to which the
unwilling participant in fact takes serious principled exception - and not
otherwise.
Let us now consider the problem that confronted Governor Dukakis
in 1977. What was the bill put before him by the General Court? What
conclusion should he have come to as to its validity?
From the discussion of Nicholls," it will be recalled that the 1935 Massachusetts statute required "[ejach teacher [to] cause the pupils under his
charge to salute the flag and recite in unison with him at said opening
exercises at least once each week the 'Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag;' ""'
moreover, the statute provided that a teacher's "failure for a period of
two consecutive weeks.., to salute the flag and recite said pledge as aforesaid, or to cause the pupils under his charge so to do,""' 5 could result in
112. Id. at 715. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented. The principal
thrust of the dissent was that Barnette was concerned with compelled avowal of a set of
beliefs, and that being required to put New Hampshire's license plates on one's car offered
no basis for others to impute to the licensee any philosophic commitment to the motto
embossed on the plate - especially when one was free, by bumper sticker or otherwise, to
festoon one's automobile with credos dissenting from "Live Free or Die." Another dissenting opinion - by Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist - addressed
a procedural issue not pertinent to the present discussion.
113. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
114. 297 Mass. at 67-68, 7 N.E.2d at 578.
115. Act of May 13, 1935, ch. 258, 1935 Mass. Acts 306.
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a fine of up to five dollars. The 1977 bill undertook to amend the 1935
statute by substituting for the first of these requirements the following:
"Each teacher at the commencement of the first class of each day in all
grades in all public schools shall lead the class in a group recitation of
the 'Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag.' ",6It is to be noted that the new
prescriptive language called for a daily rather than a weekly flag observance. But it is also to be noted that the new prescriptive language omitted the "salute" and required the teacher to "lead the class in a group
recitation" of the Pledge rather than to "cause the pupils... to... recite
in unison with him ... ;" however, the unchanged penalty provision
retained the words "salute" and "cause." ' " That the legislature was principally concerned with the Pledge, as distinct from the salute, and wanted
to increase the frequency of flag observance ceremonies, is confirmed by
the bill's title - "An Act requiring recitation of the pledge of allegiance
to the flag in all public schools at the commencement of class each day."''s
The Governor, a lawyer, was doubtful of the bill's constitutionality.
So he took advantage of the remarkable advisory opinion procedure that
has been part of Massachusetts' fundamental law since 1780 - "Each
branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall
have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions" ' - to ask the Supreme Judicial Court what it thought of the bill.
Specifically, the Governor inquired whether the amendatory language (1)
when "coupled with a fine for non-compliance" would infringe the rights
of teachers under the federal or the Massachusetts Constitution, and (2)
would infringe the rights of students under either Constitution. The
request for an advisory opinion was submitted on April 27, 1977, and was
responded to on May 16, 1977. "The Justices did not solicit briefs in this
matter because of the shortness of time within which our opinion had to
be submitted. We allowed the Attorney General's request to submit a
memorandum. That memorandum considered G. L. c. 71, § 69, as now in
effect, and concluded that '[ijnsofar as c. 71, § 69 may be read categorically to require teacher participation, it is inconsistent with the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and may not be

enforced.'

120

Two opinions were filed by the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court:
Five members of the court answered "Yes" to the first question
propounded - namely whether the 1977 bill to amend the 1935 statute
116. MASS.
117. Id

ANN. LAWS

ch. 71 § 69 (Law. Co-op. 1978).

118. Id.

119. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2. More or less similar procedures obtain inthree
other New England states - Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island - and in Alabama,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, North Carolina, and South Dakota; some other states have tried
and abandoned the idea. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. MELTZER & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70 (3d ed. 1988).
120. Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N.E.2d 251, 253 n.3
(1977).
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would be an infringement of the constitutional rights of teachers - and
therefore "beg[ged] leave to be excused from answering""' the further
question whether the bill would infringe upon the constitutional rights
of students. En route to their non-answer to the second question, the five
justices noted that the 1935 statute "contains no criminal penalty for a
student who fails to participate in the recitation of the pledge of allegiance to the flag," and added that "[wie think it is clear from the opinion
... in the Barnette case ... that no punishment of any kind may be imposed
on a student who elects, as a matter of principle, to abstain from participation."12 As to the first question, the five justices stated that "[i]n our
view, the rationale of the Barnette opinion applies as well to teachers as
it does to students,""' and cited three cases so holding.' 24 The five justices
did express considerable doubt that the 1935 statute, if amended in the
fashion contemplated by the 1977 bill, should as a textual matter be read
as imposing a fine on a teacher who did not lead students in the Pledge;"15
but the justices concluded that the existence of a statutory requirement
to lead students in the Pledge would be unconstitutionally coercive even
if no criminal penalties could be imposed." 6
Two justices responded to the Governor in a somewhat different way.
They acknowledged that Nicholls, the 1937 case in which the Supreme
121. Id, 363 N.E.2d at 255.
122. Id
123. Id at 254.
124. The cited cases were Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.
1972)(overturning dismissal of teacher who stood with hands at side during flag ceremony)
cert.denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170,171 (D. Conn. 1970)
(overturning dismissal of teacher who refused to lead or recite Pledge because" 'with liberty
and justice to all,' was an untrue statement of present fact and 'was not a pledge to work
for something' "); and State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534,278 A.2d 263 (1971) (Maryland statute exempting from obligatory flag salute students and teachers who have "religious reasons" for non-participation held unconstitutionally too circumscribed, because Barnette
protects a teacher's principled right to select his own mode of and time for expressing loyalty
to the United States).
Another case, decided after the Opinion of the Justices, in which a teacher's discharge
was upheld, is distinguishable. Palmer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271
(7th Cir. 1979) (upholding discharge of teacher who refused on religious grounds to participate in a wide range of curricular activities, of which the flag-salute was only a part), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
125. The pertinent provisions of the 1935 statute, as they would be amended by the 1977
bill, provided:
Each teacher at the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades
in all public schools shall lead the class in a group recitation of the "Pledge
of Allegiance" to the Flag. A flag shall be displayed in each classroom in each
such schoolhouse. Failure for a period of five consecutive days by the principal or teacher in charge of a school equipped as aforesaid to display the flag
as above required, or failure for a period of two consecutive weeks by a teacher
to salute the flag and recite said pledge as aforesaid, or to cause the pupils
under his charge so to do, shall be punished for every such period by a fine
or [sic] not more than five dollars.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71 § 69 (Law. Co-op. 1978).
126. 363 N.E.2d at 255. In considering whether a teacher could have securely ignored
the statutory command simply because no criminal penalties would be entailed, it is well
to remember that in Nicholls the Supreme Judicial Court sustained expulsion of the plaintiff notwithstanding that the 1935 statute did not in terms impose penalties on a recalcitrant
student.
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Judicial Court had sustained the expulsion of a third-grader for nonparticipation in the flag ceremony, had been undermined by Barnette.And
the two justices also acknowledged "that teachers who find the salute or
pledge 'morally objectionable' cannot be required to participate in the
salute or pledge."" Here the two justices cited Wooley v. Maynard 28 The
reference to Wooley v. Maynard decided just a week before Governor
Dukakis submitted his questions to the Supreme Judicial Court, evidently
was directed to Chief Justice Burger's observation, rooted in Barnette,
that the "First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a
point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster ...an
'
idea they find morally objectionable."129
Furthermore, the two justices,
like their five colleagues, were disposed to read the 1977 bill as not imposing any fine on a teacher who declined to lead students in a recital of the
Pledge. But these determinations led the two justices to the following conclusions: "There is no constitutional obstacle to a provision for voluntary
participation by students and teachers in a pledge of allegiance to the flag.
We would construe the bill to provide an opportunity for such voluntary
participation. So construed, it is not unconstitutional." 1' 10
The view of the two disagreeing justices that constitutional questions
could be obviated by construing the bill to provide for voluntary participation may have a certain surface appeal; but, on reflection, it seems to
me quixotic. The bill provided that "each teacher at the commencement
of the first class in each day ...shall lead the class in a group recitation
of the 'Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag.' "I3'This is not the prose of voluntarism; it is the familiar directive prose in which statutes are ordinarily
cast. A decent respect for his colleagues in the legislature should have
impelled the Governor to take them at their words. He did, and vetoed
the bill. Had the legislature voted a bill authorizing voluntary flag observance ceremonies, the Governor would presumably have signed it. Had
the legislature voted a bill requiring flag observance ceremonies, but
exempting those unwilling to participate on grounds of principle, the
Governor very likely would have signed it, leaving to the courts the resolution, case by case, of the ancillary constitutional problems such legislation might, in certain applications, entail. 32 The bill presented to Governor
127. Id at 256.
128. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
129. Id at 715. The two disagreeing justices also cited Russo v. Central School Dist.,
469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 932 (1973), and Hanover v. Northrup, 325
F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970), two of the cases relied on by the other justices. See supra note
124.
130. 363 N.E.2d at 256 (citations omitted).
131. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71 § 69 (Law. Co-op. 1978).
132. The five justices, in the concluding paragraph of their response to the Governor,
observed that
[if the Legislature enacted a statute which permitted a student or teacher to
sit quietly without participating in the pledge of allegiance by others in a classroom, different and yet still difficult constitutional questions would be
presented, on which our opinion has not and could not be sought by the Governor inthe circumstances.
Id at 255. Compare State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 278 A.2d 263 (1971) (protecting teacher's
right to refuse on nonreligious grounds to participate in the pledge of allegiance).
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Dukakis was obligatory and contained no exemptions. It may well be the
case that the 1977 bill was no more flawed, from a constitutional perspective, than the 1935 statute it sought to amend, but it was also no less
3
so. Under Barnette, Wooley, and the teacher cases in lower courts, ' the
1935 statute was, as the Massachusetts Attorney General had advised
the Supreme Judicial Court, a mandate that, if "read categorically to
require teacher participation ... is inconsistent with the First Amend1 34
ment of the Constitution of the United States and may not be enforced."
Accordingly, Governor Dukakis was right in vetoing a bill that, at a minimum, compounded the 1935 statute's difficulties by calling for daily,
rather than weekly, obligatory flag ceremonies. He was right, that is, if
his duty in deciding whether to approve the bill was to withhold approval
if, under prevailing constitutional doctrine, there was no realistic likelihood that the courts would sustain enforcement of the bill.
B. What Deference Did GovernorDukakis Owe to Barnette?
I have proceeded up to this point on the assumption that Governor
Dukakis' problem was to predict the judicial response to enforcement of
the 1977 bill, signing the bill if he expected acquiescence and vetoing it
if he were quite sure that the courts would overturn it. But the assumption may impose too great a constraint on the governor of a sovereign
state. Suppose that Governor Dukakis, a graduate of the Harvard Law
School, had been convinced that Barnette was profoundly misguided and
that former Professor Frankfurter had been right all along. In asking this
question, I am not intimating any sympathy on my part with such a conviction. Although, as noted, I have difficulties with Justice Jackson's analysis, I have always thought Barnette was rightly decided, and nothing
said in the presidential campaign has altered my view."5 However, I am
133. See cases cited supra note 124.
134. 363 N.E.2d at 253 n.3.
135. In his speech on August 18, 1988, accepting the Republican nomination for the
Presidency, Vice President Bush said: "Should public school teachers be required to lead
our children in the Pledge of Allegiance? My opponent says no - but I say yes." In a speech
on August 23, 1988, the Vice President said: "I would have signed it because I think that
symbolism of our country, one nation under God, is good and I don't think it hurts the children at all to say that Pledge in school." N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at B6, col. 5. He returned
to the theme in a speech the following day. "What is it about the Pledge of Allegiance that
upsets [Governor Dukakis] so much? It's very hard for me to imagine that the Founding
Fathers, Samuel Adams and John Hancock and John Adams would have objected to teachers
leading students in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States." N.Y. Times,
Aug. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 4. (Hancock and the two Adamses - all of whom came from Governor Dukakis' home state of Massachusetts - were signers of the Declaration of Independence; none of them, however, participated in the Constitutional Convention or was a member
of the Congress that framed the Bill of Rights). A November 1, 1988 letter to The New York
Times from Professor Burton Caine of Temple Law School, expresses puzzlement as to what
Vice President Bush believes to be the proper exercise of the veto. Professor Caine writes,
in pertinent part:
Last week President Reagan vetoed an act of Congress which would have
provided protection for Government employees who discover fraud or mismanagement. The President had promised both parties his support for the bill
but vetoed it anyway on the advice from the Attorney General that the law
somehow violated the Constitution. No decision of the Supreme Court was cited.
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prepared to entertain the possibility that a governor, or a legislator, or
even a President, could conscientiously disagree. What then?
Two propositions are in tension. The law - and especially the supreme
law of the Constitution - must be complied with. At the same time, the
law - and especially the supreme law of the Constitution - must always
be open to reexamination. Our nation's interest in the constant revivification of the law means, at a minimum, that litigants, private and public,
should always be free to urge on the courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, a sober second look at a significant constitutional holding. Thus,
Vice President Bush did not criticize the President's veto and presumably
agreed with it.
The Constitution of the United States binds both Federal and state officials equally. Because both the President and the Governor believed that legislation presented to them violated the Constitution, they felt themselves
compelled to exercise their veto power.
Since Vice President Bush criticized Governor Dukakis but not President
Reagan, what is the constitutional principle for which Vice President Bush
stands?
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at A34, cols. 4-5.
Senator Quayle, a lawyer, had the following to say in a colloquy with Nina Totenberg
of National Public Radio on October 18, 1988:
Quayle: Well, the first freedom that you want to protect is the freedom
of our country. The freedom of our country means our country - the constitution, our government - we have a free government. We want to maintain that
freedom. But freedom means a lot of different things - freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, individual liberties.
Totenberg: You mention freedom of religion. Do you think that Jehovah's
Witnesses should be free to refuse to say the pledge of allegiance in school if
it violates their religious principles to do so.
Quayle: Well, I think that the pledge of allegiance legislation that has been
passed at the state levels on having a teacher lead a class in a pledge of allegiance is perfectly proper and they have the freedom to lead in that pledge of
allegiance and I don't think it is going to infringe on anybody else's freedom.
Totenberg: But you realize that a teacher who is a Jehovah's Witness who
felt that that was a violation of his or her faith would be violating a criminal
statute if he or she refused to lead the pledge.
Quayle: We have freedom of religion and we have a free legislature, an
independent government that passes laws and the courts of this land uphold
and take freedom of religion very importantly and to my knowledge - and
we'll see if the courts get into this - the pledge of allegiance statutes passed
meet the constitutional test of freedom of religion.
Totenberg: No, Senator, they've been struck down every time.
Quayle: Well, I don't know, there's a lot of various laws on the books.
The one in Massachusetts hasn't been struck down. The one that the governor has here in Illinois, I don't think has been struck down.
Totenberg- They've never been enforced.
Quayle: Well, they're on the books.
Another sort of jurisprudence is exemplified by the following excerpts from a comment
by Professor Charles R. Kesler, a political scientist at Claremont College:
Now the relevance of [Barnette]to the Massachusetts law is doubtful, as
the.Massachusetts court admitted, because Barnette concerned primarily the
right of students to be exempt from saying the pledge, whereas the bill vetoed
by Dukakis required simply that teachers lead the pledge. But the Barnette
decision does provide insight into Dukakis's view of the Constitution, which
is consistent with progressive or liberal jurisprudence as it has developed over
the past century.
Consider this famous sentence from the 1943 case. "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation," Justice Jackson writes, "it is that
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to take a very contemporary example, it has been pursuant to this process
that counsel - including counsel for the United States, as amicus - have
on occasion urged the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade,,36advice it has thus
far not followed.'17 But this advice has come in cases in which the Court
has considered the validity of state statutes contended by their proponents to be consistent with, not contradictory of, Roe v. Wade.
By contrast, for a state to adopt, and seek to enforce, legislation
designedly in conflict with established Supreme Court precedent at a time
when - as was certainly true with the flag-salute issue in 1977, and
remains true today - the relevant case law suggests no slight glimmer
of likelihood that the Court will change its mind, would be a course fraught
with real danger to our federal system. As Justice Frankfurter observed
in his Barnette dissent:
The flag salute requirement in this case comes before us with the
full authority of the State of West Virginia. We are in fact passing judgment on "the power of the State as a whole." Practically
we are passing upon the political power of each of the forty-eight
states. Moreover, since the First Amendment has been read into
the Fourteenth, our problem is precisely the same as it would be
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein."
But by what authority did these officials - six Supreme Court justices decree that there shall be no political orthodoxy in America and then force
citizens to abide by their opinion? That there shall be no orthodoxy is itself
an orthodoxy. This contradiction is, to borrow Willmoore Kendall's phrase,
the Achilles' heel of all relativism. It happens also to violate the innermost
logic of the American political tradition, which began by declaring the "selfevident" truth that "all men are created equal .. "
That it should now be controversial to lead schoolchildren in the pledge
only shows how strained the American consensus has become after decades
of liberal reformism.
Legal Intelligencer, Nov. 3, 1988, at 9, col. 1. Professor Kesler is, of course, entitled to disagree with Barnette.The operative question is, however, whether a governor (or a President,
see text infra, at notes 146-53) is entitled to predicate exercise or non-exercise of the veto
on disagreement with Barnette.
The issue of the New Yorker published during election week provides a clue as to the
provenance of the Pledge as an issue in the campaign:
A story in the Washington Postdescribes how, one evening last May, five
of George Bush's campaign advisers went to Paramus, New Jersey, to observe
a group of thirty voters assembled by Bush researchers as a test group to measure the emotional impact of campaign themes. The advisers were Roger Ailes,
Lee Atwater, Robert Teeter, Craig Fuller and Nicholas Brady. They went behind
a two-way mirror and watched as the group was told about furloughed prisoners,
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Boston Harbor, and at the end of the session
Governor Dukakis's support among the group had dropped from 30 to 15. "I
realized right there that we had the wherewithal to win ...and that the sky
was the limit on Dukakis's negative," Atwater said.
New Yorker, Nov. 14, 1988, at 32.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
The United States has reiterated this advice in Webster v. Reproductive Health Service,

No. 88-605, probable jurisdiction noted on January 9, 1989, 109 S. Ct. 780, argued April
26, 1989.
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if we1 38had before us an Act of Congress for the District of Columbia.

For one state to defy the law as theretofore announced by the Court
would invite the constitutional disequilibrium that roused the Court's concern in Cooper v. Aaron,3 9 the case in which Governor Faubus sought to
frustrate the desegregation of Little Rock's Central High School. When,
in 1986, Attorney General Meese, in an address at Tulane, 40 took the Court
to task for what he read as overly extravagant claims of judicial supremacy
in Cooper v. Aaron - putting the Court's opinions on a parity with the

Constitution itself - the Attorney General was himself promptly taken
to task in an editorial in the Washington Post.'

Shortly thereafter, the

Attorney General qualified what he had said at Tulane. In particular he
stated certain cautions that seem particularly relevant to the present
question:
Supreme Court decisions do, of course, have general applicability. In addition to binding the parties in the case at hand, a decision is binding precedent on lower federal courts as well as state
courts. Further, such decisions, as Lincoln once said, are "entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases"
by the other departments of government, both federal and state.
Arguments from prudence, the need for stability in the law, and
respect for the judiciary will and should persuade officials of these
other institutions to abide by a decision of the Court. It would
for them not to conform their behavior to
be highly irresponsible
142
precedent.

The proper course for a governor, faced with a bill he believes in but
that contradicts the Constitution as the Supreme Court has expounded
it, is to veto the bill, explain the constitutional difficulties, and propose
appropriate revisions. This is the course followed a year ago, in relation
to a constitutionally flawed anti-abortion bill, by Pennsylvania's Governor Casey."' Governor Casey's predecessor, Governor Thornburgh, had
followed the same course six years before.'" Governor Casey explained
his 1987 veto eloquently and succinctly:
I was elected Governor of Pennsylvania to carry out the
pledges I made to the people of this Commonwealth, and I will
not break faith with those people, or break my promises to them.
I have stated repeatedly that I am opposed to abortion on every
moral ground ....

This legislation, if corrected in the manner dis-

138. 319 U.S. at 650 (citations omitted).
139. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

140. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979-90 (1987).

141. Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1986, at A18, col. 1.
142. Meese, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1003, 1003-04 (1987).
143. Letter from Governor Robert P. Casey to the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 17, 1987).
144. Letter from Governor Dick Thornburgh to the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 23, 1981).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 16
LAND AND WATER LAW REviEw

Vol. XXIV

cussed below, will provide us with an opportunity to take a step
forward in limiting this destruction.
In its present form, however, I have concluded that it is not
constitutional and that I must veto it.
I promised the people of Pennsylvania, and I took an oath,
that I would uphold the Constitution. The legitimacy of our system of government, the finest on earth, depends not just upon our
pursuit 4of the moral good, but also upon our adherence to the rule
of law.' 5
At the national level, there may be greater scope for the political
branches to inject into the law-making process their disagreements with
authoritative judicial pronouncements. President Jackson, we recall, in
part justified his veto of a bill that would have chartered a third Bank
of the United States on the ground that the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Marshall, had been wrong, in McCuUoch v. Marylandl,4 6 in upholding congressional power to establish the Second Bank. And Lincoln, in
his debates with Douglas - those real debates that we have not seen the
like of since - made it plain that if he vanquished Douglas in their Senate
47
race, he would challenge Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott.
"If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether
slavery should be prohibited in a new territory,
in spite of that Dred Scott
148
decision, I would vote that it should.'
Would the Lincoln and Jackson precedents offer support to a Congress and a President that wanted to require public school children and
their teachers, in the District of Columbia or some other federal enclave,
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance notwithstanding their religious or otherwise principled objections? I think not. Jackson's veto of the Bank bill
did not impose constraints on anyone; to the contrary, it declined (subject to override by Congress) to perpetuate a substantial quasi-governmental structure and set of processes. Similarly, Lincoln's proposed
reinstitution of prohibitions on slavery in federal territories49would have
worked to dissolve governmentally maintained servitude.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Letter, supra note 143, at 1-3.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
A. Lincoln, Speech at Chicago (July 10, 1858), reprinted in P. ANGLE, CREATED
EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 36 (1958).
149. In one sense, of course, this is an incomplete statement. One of the propositions
announced by Chief Justice Taney, in his extended opinion in Dred Scott, was that
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty
or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
60 U.S. at 450. If one were to give authoritative weight to this first whisper from a justice
of substantive due process, then Lincoln's proposed law would be perceived as intending
to work a deprivation of the slaveholder's Fifth Amendment rights. I would argue that the
Chief Justice's pronouncement was dictum and did not command the endorsement of a
majority of his Court.
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Moreover, with respect to Dred Scott, it is of particular importance
that the doctrine Lincoln would have sought to challenge through new
legislation and further litigation had been newly minted just a year before.
The Court had not - as it had with Barnette - had the opportunity for
sober second thought leading on the one hand to modification or rejection, or on the other hand to reaffirmation. The distinction is a crucial
one. Professor Herbert Wechsler made the point in 1965, in calling on state
officials in the South finally to acquiesce in the Supreme Court's rulings
in Brown v. Board of Education"' and subsequent cases. "When that
chance [of a new court challenge to a controversial decision] has been
exploited and has run its course, with reaffirmation rather than reversal
of decision, has not the time arrived when its acceptance is demanded,
without insisting on repeated litigation? The answer, it seems to me, must
be affirmative.... It is not surprising.., that the bar has raised its voice
so loudly on this problem, calling for a generous acceptance of decisions
when their doctrine has been settled, as an act of self-subordination necessary to maintain the rule of law. There comes a point where there can be
only one answer to the call."'
Congress and the President have this year collaborated on legislation
which fits my prescription of an appropriate form of rejection by the political branches of a Supreme Court opinion. The opinion was that in
Korematsu v. United States,' 2decided in late 1944, a year-and-a-half after
Barnette. In Korematsu, the Court sustained the wartime internment of
American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry. The Court
has had subsequent occasion to cite Korematsu, but it has never reaffirmed
that ominous and unprecedented ruling. If the decision in Barnette was
one of the high points of our constitutional jurisprudence, the decision
in Korematsu was surely close to the nadir, vying with Dred Scott and
Plessy v. Ferguson."' In the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,15 Congress
enacted and the President approved a statute providing modest reparations for those interned. Section 2(a) of the Act is as follows:
The Congress recognizes that, as described by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, a grave
injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens
of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II. As the Commission documents, these actions were carried out without adequate security
reasons and without any acts of espionage or sabotage documented by the Commission, and were motivated largely by racial
prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.
The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous
damages, both material and intangible, and there were incalcul150. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
151. Wechsler, The Courts and The Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1965).
Cf.Carter, The Courts Are Not The Constitution, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at A18, col. 4.
152. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (result vacated on writ of coriam nobis, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.
Cal. 1984)).
153. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
154. Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

33

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 16
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIV

able losses in education and job training, all of which resulted in
significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation
has not been made. For these fundamental violations of the basic
civil liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of
Japanese ancestry, the Congress apologies on behalf of the
Nation. 55'
CONCLUSION

In Barnette, Justice Jackson wrote that "[t]he case is made difficult
not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag
involved is our own."

158

With this in mind, I will, in closing, read some words of Oliver Wendell Holmes spoken a month before he turned sixty. In the measured
cadences you will hear the young man who, forty years before, was Class
Poet of the Harvard College Class of 1861 - and who, a few months after
leaving Harvard, was serving as a lieutenant in the Twentieth Massachusetts and was wounded at Balls Bluff, as he was later to be wounded
at Antietam and at Fredericksburg. Holmes, as Chief Justice of Massachusetts, was speaking from the bench of the Supreme Judicial Court.
The date was February 4, 1901. The occasion was the centenary of the
day that John Marshall was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States:
A few words more and I have done. We live by symbols, and
what shall be symbolized by any image of the sight depends upon
the mind of him who sees it. The setting aside of this day in honor
of a great judge may stand to a Virginian for the glory of his glorious State; to a patriot for the fact that time has been on Marshall's
side, and that the theory for which Hamilton argued, and he
decided, and Webster spoke, and Grant fought, and Lincoln died,
is now our corner-stone. To the more abstract but farther-reaching
contemplation of the lawyer, it stands for the rise of a new body
of jurisprudence, by which guiding principles are raised above the
reach of statute and State, and judges are entrusted with a solemn
and hitherto unheard-of authority and duty.
It is all a symbol, if you like, but so is the flag. The flag is
but a bit of bunting to one who insists on prose. Yet, thanks to
Marshall and to the men of his generation - and for this above
all we celebrate him and them - its red is our lifeblood, its stars
our world, its blue our heaven. It owns our land. At will it throws
away our lives.157
I suggest to you that what gives our flag this power over our lives
is that, under the Constitution, it does not govern our minds and spirits.
155. Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
156. 319 U.S. at 641.
157. THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 385 M. Lemer, ed., 1943).
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